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 In this debate, an important element is the distribution between external corruption which involves an 
individual violation of duty and internal corruption which is likely to take the form of collusion. 
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 In Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), the optimal incentive system is affected by the possibility of collusion with an 
external supervisor .Sometimes, the external/internal supervisor will not be used as a response to possible 
collusion. 
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 As noted by Kofman and Lawarrée (1993), this means that the agent is unable to force the supervisor to send a 
falsified report and the supervisor cannot falsify the report without the help of the agent. 
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 Qizilbash (1994) notes that the two approaches have to be distinguished concerning morals ans preferences. On 
the one hand, morality can directly enter into the individual’s utility function through negative feelings. On other 
hand, moral considerations can be incorporated by the use of lexical preferences. 
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 Laffont and Tirole (1993) do not discuss the issue of the supervisor’s preferences in problems of regulation 
under possible collusive behavior in three-tier hierarchies. In our framework, the monetary value of the agent’s 
collusive activity may be seen as endogenous. 
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 Corruption is mainly characterized by reciprocal relationships between bibers and public officials ,negative 
welfare effects and penalties in case of discovery: corruption remains a risky activity both for the bribers and the 
bribees ( see Abbink et al.,1999). 
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 For an overview on the costs and the benefits of job rotation, see Gosgel and Miceli (2001); In a different 
setting related to the firm’s choice, some firms promote high degrees of specialization in their organization of 
work, but the rotation of jobs also produces certain benefits that outweigh lost productivity from reduced 
specialization. 
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